Sabotaging Pak-Afghan relations

Dr Qaisar Rashid
 

While playing the blame game and sullying the image of Pakistan, the Kabul government failed to realise that Pakistan had intertwined its own peace with that of Afghanistan.

Some days ago, on June 22, a few Taliban militants detonated a car bomb outside the National Assembly in Kabul. The attackers launched rocket-propelled grenades at the building before they were killed by the Afghan national security force. The government of Afghanistan laid blame on Pakistan by saying that the bomb was loaded into the car in Peshawar and a man named Bilal, belonging to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was the mastermind who funded the project carried out by the Haqqani network. Reportedly, the Afghan government had been on alert since June 10 because of intelligence reports of the probable attack. Nevertheless, the timing was important because, at the time of the attack, the newly appointed defence minister, Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, was delivering a parliamentary speech.
Is it possible for any officer of an intelligence agency of Pakistan to sabotage the friendly overtures made by a high profile Pakistani delegation consisting of the Prime Minister (PM), the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and the Director General (DG) of the ISI that visited Kabul on May 12 this year? The delegation opened a new chapter for Pakistan-Afghan relations by condemning the attacks carried out by the Taliban on Kabul and by declaring the attacks acts of terrorism. The delegation wanted to assure the Kabul government that both the civilian and military leaderships were on the same page and were determined to support the Kabul government, led by Ashraf Ghani, the president of Afghanistan. The delegation also wanted to make its position on the so-called spring offensive clear to the Taliban, as well as to the world. One of the reasons for this high level commitment was the Peshawar school attack, carried out by the Taliban, which devoured more than 100 lives of innocent school children in December last year.
If the car carried any sign of being tampered with in Peshawar, does that mean Pakistan was responsible for the attack? Is it not possible for any operative of the ISI to be a malcontent and act on his own to sabotage the efforts of improving bilateral relations? If there was a Pakistani mastermind, how could it be certain that he belonged to the ISI? How could the car manage to evade the security barriers in Kabul to reach its destination? Even if it is assumed that there was support available at the individual level to the perpetrators of the attack, the Haqqani network, was it advisable to condemn Pakistan publicly? These are a few questions that need to be answered before arriving at a conclusion.
Furthermore, before denouncing Pakistan straightaway, the Kabul government could have utilised the close links established recently between the ISI and Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS). Both the intelligence agencies have signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to share intelligence and discourage terrorists from using their lands for subversive activities against each other. What was the utility of the MoU when the information was not shared? Were Pakistan’s efforts to improve bilateral relations really a machination to subvert the Kabul government? The answer is that they were not. While playing the blame game and sullying the image of Pakistan, the Kabul government failed to realise that Pakistan had intertwined its own peace with that of Afghanistan.
Perceivably, the attack on the parliament building could be a part of the Taliban attacks being carried out in the rest of Afghanistan. Reportedly, there are several cities and districts, in both the south and the north, which have been captured by the Taliban. Should Pakistan or any of its citizens be blamed for those as well? The Kabul government has failed to realise that it desperately needs Pakistan’s help to ensure its own survival because international players resort to regional and not international solutions for Afghanistan. Afghanistan should also mend its ways towards its neighbours, including Pakistan.
Although a NATO-led military mission called Operation Resolute Support has been functional in Afghanistan as the successor of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since January 1 this year, it is a non-combat training, advising and assistance mission, consisting of about 12,000 soldiers. The Kabul government has to rely heavily on its own Afghan national force to defend its borders against the Taliban and maintain law and order. On the other hand, Pakistan has its own trained and equipped army that can brave the Taliban threat without Afghanistan’s help. Hence, Afghanistan is more in need of Pakistan than vice versa. The Kabul government is not realising the importance of the repercussions of the allegations levelled against Pakistan on bilateral ties.
The Kabul government has failed to look for the existence of a third party, which can infuse distrust between both the countries. Why be juvenile and blame Pakistan or any of its citizens before ruling out other possibilities? The Kabul government has also failed to understand the Taliban phenomenon, which is not a single unified monolithic force but a medley of discrete groups, functioning under different commanders and labels but associated with each other, albeit loosely, for a common cause. Any splinter recusant group can outwit the Kabul government and subvert peace in Afghanistan. Prima facie, the Kabul government has shifted responsibility onto Pakistan to propitiate Afghanistan without realising the perversity of its own response. Railing against Pakistan for all the ills of Afghanistan cannot serve the purpose of peace. The advance of the Taliban in Afghanistan is a precursor to the big crisis ahead.