Bomb Making Materials: En route from India to ISIS

By: Ishaal Zehra         

Conflict Armament Research (CAR) was established in 2011 in response to “growing worldwide demand for weapon-specific technical expertise to support research, analysis and policy making.” The organization, with the financial assistance of the European Union and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, maintains a database which provides a global reporting mechanism on the illegal trade of arms, including light weapons and conventional weapons.

In 2016 CAR produced a compelling piece of research into the IED component parts being used by ISIS. The EU-funded group had analyzed improvised explosive devices (IED) collected over 20 months on Iraqi and Syrian frontlines to reveal how the so-called Islamic State has been able to amass its arsenal at an unprecedented speed.

The online published report cite that ISIS is manufacturing ever more sophisticated and devastating suicide bombs and improvised explosives using freely available civilian components from around the world. Over a period of 20 months, from July 2014 to February 2016, CAR field investigation teams in Iraq and Syria worked in concert with Iraqi and Syrian forces to document materiel recovered in military action against ISIS forces. Their partners included the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units, the Iraqi Federal Police, the Kurdistan Region Security Council, the Peshmerga forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, and the Military Council of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria. The components documented in the report were recovered during major battles around the Iraqi towns of al Rabia, Kirkuk, Mosul, and Tikrit and the Syrian town of Kobane.

The study revealed that 51 companies from countries including Turkey, India, Brazil, and the United States produced, sold or received more than 700 components used by ISIS to build improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Further investigation found that IS forces have manufactured and deployed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) across the battlefield on a quasi-industrial scale. Made of components that are cheap and readily available, IEDs have become IS forces’ signature weapon. Their chains of supply differ from those of military weapons. For the most part, IED components are commercial goods that are not subject to government export licenses and whose transfer is far less scrutinized and regulated than the transfer of weapons.

Interestingly, as per the report our dear neighbor India, one of the country involved in the supply chain of components used by IS forces to construct IEDs, is the second largest supplier of bomb-making material to IS. Seven Indian companies manufactured most of the detonators, detonating cord, and safety fuses documented by CAR’s field investigation teams. Under Indian law, transfer of this material requires a license. Hence, those were all legally exported under government-issued licenses from India to entities in Lebanon and Turkey, CAR found.

Detonating Cord and Safety Fuse:- IS forces regularly employ detonating cord in their IEDs to complete the explosive train between the detonator and the main explosive charge.

The investigation team found several spools of detonating cords manufactured by Solar Industries, India, which were exported to a Turkish company and to the Lebanese company Maybel, headquartered in Beirut.

Earlier, CAR also documented the use of Solar Industries detonating cord by IS forces on the Makhmour front line in Iraq at the end of 2014. There is no evidence to indicate to which regional entity Solar Industries supplied the cord.

On 24 February 2015, a CAR field investigation team in Kobane documented a spool of detonating cord produced by Premier Explosives Ltd., India. Premier Explosives has confirmed that it sold 6 million metres of detonating cord to the Mechanical Construction Factory, Syria, in 2009 and 2010.

The team also documented a spool of detonating cord produced by Rajasthan Explosives and Chemicals, India and also a spool of safety fuse produced by the Indian company Chamundi Explosives.

Detonators:- IS forces employ a combination of electric and non-electric (plain) detonators during the fabrication of their IEDs, fuses, and improvised weapon systems (such as rockets, rocket-assisted mortars, and other improvised projected weapons).

YPG forces captured electric detonators manufactured by an Indian company Economic Explosives on 25 December 2012 and exported them (on an unspecified date) to the Lebanese company Maybel, Beirut.

At the same location, CAR field investigators observed plain and electric detonators produced by Rajasthan Explosives and Chemicals, India; plain detonators produced by Premier Explosives, India; and electric detonators produced by IDEAL Industrial Explosives, India.

"These findings support growing international awareness that ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria are very much self-sustaining - acquiring weapons and strategic goods, such as IED components, locally and with ease," said James Bevan, CAR's executive director.

The sale of these cheap and readily available parts, some of which are not subject to government export licences, is far less scrutinised and regulated than the transfer of weapons.

Perhaps the most significant finding of this report concerns the speed with which ISIS forces have been able to acquire IED components. The appearance of these components in possession of ISIS forces, as little as one month following their lawful supply to commercial entities in the region, speaks to a lack of monitoring by national governments and companies alike. It may also indicate a lack of awareness surrounding the potential use of these civilian-market components by terrorist and insurgent forces. The study found that ISIS is able to acquire some components in as little as a month after their lawful supply to firms in the region, suggesting a lack of oversight in the supply chain.

James Bevan says the group was continually experimenting, refining and creating new types of IEDs ranging from suicide and car bombs to landmines, booby traps and improvised mortars.

The inventions have taken a heavy toll on the Peshmerga, Shia militias, Kurdish YPG, opposition rebels and other forces attempting to take back ISIS territory.

“Whenever they try to liberate an area, that area is absolutely littered with IEDs and they are causing the greatest amount of casualties,” Mr Bevan said. “It’s on a larger scale than we’ve seen in recent conflicts.”

CAR’s investigations map out the legal trade in component parts across the region. In all identified cases, producers have lawfully traded components with regional trade and distribution companies. These companies, in turn, have sold them to smaller commercial entities. By allowing individuals and groups affiliated with ISIS forces to acquire components used in IEDs, these small entities appear to be the weakest link in the chain of custody.

All companies and countries named in the report have been informed of the findings as investigations continue in Ramadi and other territory recently retaken from ISIS. Now the question remains that how India and others involved in this deadly supply-chain will tackle this alarming situation.