Intentional or not, U.S. counterterror
operations are pushing militants into Balochistan, the heart of CPEC.
By Ian Price
When the United States
added Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (TTP-JA), a faction of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), to
the terror list in July 2016 following their claim of responsibility for a
failed car bombing in Manhattan, it helped to push the group out of the tribal region
of Pakistan and into areas that China was eying for their multibillion economic
corridor project. This was part of a larger strategy that eventually created
immeasurable headaches for both the security establishment in Islamabad and
officials in Beijing, potentially causing billions of dollars in losses for
both. Given Washington’s growing acrimonious ties with Pakistan and desire to
constrain China’s expansion, this seems a fortuitous coincidence. But was it
simply an unplanned consequence of Washington’s war on terror, or a calculated
outcome set into motion specifically to keep Pakistan and China in check?
It’s no secret that
Pakistan has fallen out of Washington’s good graces in recent times.
The current dip in relations culminated in a U.S. bill introduced on
September 20 seeking to officially designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism. Pakistan
has also seen the writing on the wall, allegedly using their networks to
disrupt progress in Afghanistan and cozying up to China as a new source for weapons and economic growth. The China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC), for which China announced nearly $50 billion in funding in
late 2014, would be the triumph of their growing relationship. This was
certainly unwelcome news for the United States, who had a cautious eye on both
countries, but there was no way for Washington to directly intervene.
Indirectly, however, Washington seems to have succeeded in meddling with the
project through a recent intensification of operations in east Afghanistan.
When the TTP-JA was added to the U.S. State Department’s global terrorist
list, it significantly expanded Washington’s options for dealing with the
organization. The United States has already used drone strikes against
designated Taliban groups in a number of instances, including a May 21 strike
in Pakistan’s Balochistan that killed TTP leader Akhtar Mohammad Mansour and a November 2015 strike that
killed another commander, Khan Saeed, in the Khost province of
Afghanistan. As illustrated by precedents involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
various Islamic State (ISIS) holdings, when the United States puts a
group on the list, they intend to target it aggressively.
At the same time,
security forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan aren’t sitting idly by, waving to
drones as they buzz overhead and leaving all of the work for the Americans. In
the last week of July alone, joint U.S.-Afghan operations killed an estimated 300
ISIS militants in eastern Afghanistan. In Pakistan, security forces have
launched no less than three large-scale operations against TTP elements in the
Federally Administered Tribal Region (FATA) that borders Balochistan, also
reportedly killing hundreds militants since they began in 2014. Operation
Khyber 3, launched on August 17, claimed 14 militant lives in its
opening salvo.
Now, where can the
militants run? Traditionally, Kabul and Islamabad both blame the other for
abetting TTP and other terrorist groups in their borders, and to an extent both
are correct. The porous border region between the two countries is much like
the wild west, and terrorists enjoy a relatively large amount of freedom of
movement in the less secure areas. As Pakistan turns up the heat in the FATA,
militants are pushed into Afghanistan, and vice versa when Afghanistan kicks up
operations. Now, with nowhere to run on either side of the border, many tribal
militants are now making a home for themselves in nearby Balochistan.
Unlike in traditional
Taliban strongholds, Balochistan’s security arrangements are much less
comprehensive. The same areas in Quetta, Balochistan’s capital city, are
targeted over and over and over despite, or perhaps because of, headway in the FATA.
And while the dominant ethnic group of the province is Baloch, there is still a
sizable Pashtun population in northern Balochistan to blend into, including in
and around Quetta. Balochistan also has its own border with Afghanistan that
militants can move through.
Not only are TTP-JA and
other Taliban elements being pushed into Balochistan, but they are now more
actively carrying out attacks, which is hardly an unpredictable consequence.
Between their founding in 2007 and when the United States added the TTP to the
terror list on September 1, 2010, the TTP had claimed or is believed to have
carried out at least 16 attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere
that resulted in an estimated 370 deaths. After their addition to America’s
global terror list, the TTP carried out approximately 32 attacks over the next
three years, resulting in almost 700 more deaths. That is a 2:1 ratio in the
frequency of attacks and amount of victims killed for the three year periods
before and after the designation.
It would be a gross
oversimplification to suggest that the uptick in activity was owed solely to
American forces targeting the TTP in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but many of the
attacks claimed by the TTP were stated to be retaliatory measures against U.S.
strikes carried out in the area. It certainly suggests, at the very least, that
Washington’s targeting of the TTP both drove them further out of their
traditional areas of influence, and challenged them to retaliate for the losses
that they accrued.
The pattern has begun to
repeat itself with the TTP-JA. In no small part thanks to the dual squeeze put
on the group by the U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan combined with the
ongoing Pakistani Khyber operations, the TTP-JA has already increased their
activity in Balochistan. Before July, the TTP-JA had claimed or is believed to
have been responsible for six attacks resulting in approximately 160 deaths. In
August and September alone, the TTP-JA is believed to have already carried out
five attacks resulting in a further 135 deaths, mostly in Quetta. The
beginnings of a worrisome trend, to be sure, but more importantly it
illustrates that when the United States begins targeting new militant
groups along the Afghan-Pakistani border, the result predicatively appears to
be an increase in terror in Pakistan. It’s simple math, and no doubt was at
least part of the overall decision-making calculus behind commencing operations
against the TTP-JA to begin with. If the security and intelligence
establishments in the United States consider this outcome to be an unfortunate
part of doing business or a deliberate means to an altogether different end
still remains an open question.
The border squeeze has
certainly complicated matters for China and their CPEC project. China’s concerns over Balochistan’s security are longstanding, and recent developments have done little to
raise Beijing’s confidence. In order to protect Chinese workers in the country,
Pakistan has promised to raise a security force of 15,000. This would include
9,000 regular Army soldiers in addition to 6,000 more paramilitary personnel.
As part of the plan,manpower will be drawn not only from Balochistan but also
other provinces, including from local police forces. Sindh province has already
voiced disapproval over the security measures, which they say
intrude on their rights. Not surprisingly, other provinces appear to be
reticent to commit soldiers to places like Balochistan, the most dangerous
province and soon-to-be home of the juiciest terror targets in the country once
construction is in full swing.
The Pakistani government
knows that it is facing an uphill battle, and so does China for that matter. In
July, five projects worth billions were already on the chopping block due to their slow start and Pakistan’s inability
to provide adequate security. As recently as September 28, Pakistani media was
reporting about China’s dissatisfaction with the current security arrangements
for the corridor and how this will affect the project’s overall timeline.
China has good reason to
be worried. There have been a number of attacks against Chinese laborers,
engineers, and businessmen in Balochistan and throughout the country since
2001. Not only that, but China has already poured in a reported $14 billion into the CPEC project already. All of this
weighs particularly heavy on the heads of Pakistani government officials who
can’t afford any more delays, as billions of dollars hang in the balance for
both countries.
And that is the crux of
the argument. Because of the upswing in terror and the degradation of the
security situation in Balochistan, Pakistan and China risk losing billions over
delays and cancellations for the CPEC project. The security situation owes to,
in no small part, the pushback that the TTP-JA and other groups have received
from the United States and her allies in eastern Afghanistan this summer.
To put it more bluntly, the United States has contributed to the degradation of
security in Balochistan, a key region for CPEC projects, risking billions for
China and Pakistan and putting a strain on their bilateral relations. It would
have been easy to predict this outcome, as many observers have. So
this ultimately raises a very interesting question: Was the United States
banking on increased violence in Balochistan all along?
Ian
Price works as a South Asia intelligence analyst for a private
company in Tel Aviv, Israel. He holds a master’s degree from Tsinghua
University in Beijing on the subject of Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy.
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