Dalvi, Sodhi & Bharat Kumar: Pointed-out Cancerous Rot in Indian Army

By:    Aasef Chauhdry

There were three crucial times in the Indian armed forces’ history when there were a lot of hullabaloos. First time the uproar was, when in 1969 Brigadier Dalvi scripted a controversial book ‘The Himalayan Blunder”. Brigadier John Parashuram Dalvi was an Indian Army officer. During the Sino-Indian War of 1962, he was the commander of the Indian 7th Brigade, which was destroyed, leading Dalvi to be captured by the People’s Liberation Army on 22 October 1962.

In his book Himalayan Blunder, Brigadier Dalvi gives his version of the events that led to India’s debacle in the Himalayas. His book corroborates Neville Maxwell’s claims in latter’s book “India’s China War”, his widely acclaimed account of the 1962 border war between India and China. Maxwell’s main thesis was that India was the belligerent party and the Indian army, though totally unprepared, had been ordered to throw the Chinese out of positions which India claimed was within Indian boundaries. The Chinese justifiably, launched a devastating pre-emptive strike against the Indian army and pushed their way to the plains of Assam. To a large extent, Dalvi’s account is in tune with Maxwell’s except for the difference on claim about all the land south of the McMahon line.

Dalvi was of the view that an unprepared Indian army was ordered to march on hard scales, carrying pouch ammunition, thrown into battle with a vastly superior Chinese army, while Maxwell claims that in NEFA, the Indian army made useless sacrifices, when a withdrawal to Bomdi La would have made much more sense. On the whole, Dalvi agreed with this assessment. Dalvi also agrees with Maxwell’s opinion that if only the Indian army had followed the plan formulated in 1959 by General Thorat which recommended a triple tiered defense structure in the north-east, it would have fared much better against the Chinese. The McMahon line could not be defended by sitting on it. Instead the Indian army ought to have retreated to Bomdi La, closer to its supply lines and fought the Chinese army when it was fully stretched.
Another equally interesting chapter deals with how Dalvi seriously considered resigning his command just before the outbreak of inevitable hostilities on 20 October 1962. Who’s to blame for India’s debacle? Dalvi puts a large portion of the blame on the arrogant and high-handed Nehru who firmly believed that the Chinese would not invade. Another big chunk is laid at the door of Lt. Gen. Brij Mohan Kaul, Nehru’s protégée who, despite not having held a war-time command, was tasked with throwing the Chinese army out of Indian borders. Dalvi made it clear that the Chinese army had prepared extensively for the war. They had prepared large prisoner of war camps and even padded winter suits for their prisoners. Dalvi tells us that the Chinese army had many ethnic Chinese who had lived in India and could speak Indian languages. Many of the local guides hired by the Indian army were allegedly in the pay of the Chinese.
Second time when there was a lot of swirls and stirs, it was due to Brigadier Harinder Singh Sodhi’s again a controversial book “Top Brass: Critical Analysis of Indian Military Leadership”. Sodhi is well known in the Indian army circles for having commanded an important Mountain Brigade during the 1971 East Pakistan’s Indian sponsored insurgency. His book offered a perceptive analysis of a number of vital factors involved in the internal operation and performance of the Indian Army. He honestly and closely investigated some crucial aspects of the Army’s interaction with the Central Government and other agencies: including secret agencies like the RAW, etc. Further, examines the much-debated subject of “civil supremacy” in military affairs and that of lack of “Professionalism” in the Army. A large number of other Indian writers have also been discussing and criticising the deteriorating professionalism in the armed forces. About few years back one Rajee Khushwaha, a renowned writer wrote a two part article under the title ‘The Rot in the Indian Army”.

In his article not only that he brought out the extent, consequences and fangs of the cancerous rot in the army and its dangers to Indian nation but also highlighted its dimensions and manifestations with emphasis on how and when the rot started. He tried to sum up a sensitive issue in just few lines by saying, “Indian army functions in ‘NO WAR-NO PEACE’ environs – No war for the Generals and No Peace for the Soldiers – Generals have enough time to indulge in merry-making and Soldiers have no time to attend to their basic needs. Soldiers are getting frustrated and generals are getting compensated for their inaction. Army is today commanded by Contractors, Arms dealers and manipulative bureaucrats. Generals have abdicated generalship to them. We sure have a rising storm of corruption”.

In his book, Brigadier Dalvi also confessed that India did not use its Air Force in an offensive role during the fighting though the IAF was, in at least a few respects, superior to the Chinese Air Force. Although, he did not analyse this issue, nevertheless, last month another book revealing shocking facts about the weaknesses of Indian Air Force has been published. The author is none other than a former Indian Air Marshal Bharat Kumar, who has admitted that India bore heavier lose in 1965 Indo-Pak war as Pakistan gunned down 35 Indian Jets just in first two days. He made this confession in his lately published book ‘The Duels of the Himalayan Eagle, the first Indo-Pak War’ which is published on the occasion when 50 years of Indo-Pak war has passed. Indian Newspaper ‘India Times’ has also posted a report in which they claimed that it was admitted in Ministry of Defense record that India suffered more than Pakistan in 1965 war but this war ended with no results.

It’s very upsetting factor for the mature and concerned Indians that amid this battle readiness and standard of professionalism, why Modi government is unnecessarily raising war cry against Pakistan and why not Modi concentrate more on improving the professional standard of the Indian armed forces?