In the sub-continent, India laid the foundation of cross-border
terrorism. The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), which was established on 21
September 1968, was preceded by the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and back in 1968
IB operatives had already begun sowing cross-border seeds to what would later
become the Mukti Bahini.
For the record, the Mukti Bahini was preceded
by the Mukti Fauj which in return was preceded denominationally by the Sangram
Parishad. Mukti Bahini guerillas-along with RAW operatives and regulars from
the Indian Army-operated training camps in the Indian states of West Bengal,
Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and Tripura.
By late 1970, the Mukti Bahini, armed and trained by India, had
begun undertaking subversive activities targeting power plants, railways,
industries, bridges, fuel depots, looting banks, raiding warehouses, mining
ships and killing non-Bengalis. On 26 March 1971, Pakistan Army initiated
Operation Searchlight-a law-and-order enforcement operation to safeguard the
lives and properties of East Pakistanis and establish the writ of the state. As
of March 1971, the total strength of Pakistan army troops posted in East
Pakistan stood at 12,000 (armed only with small weapons).
By late-April 1971, Operation Searchlight had managed to throw
the Mukti Bahini across the border back into India. Mukti Bahini’s ‘Monsoon
offensive’ was also neutralized.
On 15 May 1971, Indian Army’s Eastern Command officially
initiated ‘Operation Jackpot’ to reorganize the Mukti Bahini who were on the
run. The Indians equipped the Mukti Bahini with Italian howitzers, Dakota DC-3
aircraft, Otter DHC-3 fighter planes and Allouette helicopters (Italian
howitzers used by the Mukti Bahini are now preserved at the Bangladesh Military
Museum in Dhaka).
Operation Jackpot began churning out up to 5,000 trained
guerilla fighters every month. Mukti Bahini guerillas along with RAW operatives
and Indian Army regulars would enter East Pakistan through forward bases that
were set up in Tripura and West Bengal.
According to Archer Blood, an American career diplomat who
served as the last American Consul General to Dhaka, “Indian soil was made
available for training camps, hospitals and supply depots for the Mukti Bahini”
and the Mukti Bahini had a “safe haven to which it could retire for rest, food,
medical supplies and weapons….”
In Nagaland, the Indian Armed Forces established a jungle
airstrip for the Mukti Bahini from where Indian Air Force trained pilots
conducted sorties by Otter DHC-3 aircraft. India’s Eastern Command trained more
than 400 naval commandos and frogmen to drown vessels in Chittagong, Chandpur
and Narayanganj.
In Dehra Dun, Major-General Oban “selected the best personnel
from the Mukti Bahini” and gave them political and military training. One Mukti
Bahini Sector Commander, Quazi Nooruzzaman, writes: “Having received the
training, political commandos found it embarrassing to identify themselves as
products of the Indian authorities. So they gave themselves the name of
Bangladesh Liberation Force.”
The Mukti Bahini killed anywhere from 100,000 Biharis (according
to the ‘Chronology for Biharis in Bangladesh’) to 150,000 Biharis (according to
the ‘Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict; page 64). Qutubuddin Aziz,
in ‘Blood and Tears’, has documented 170 eye-witness accounts of the
‘atrocities committed on Biharis and other non-Bengalis’ across 55 towns,
covering ‘110 places where the slaughter of the innocents took place’.
According to Lawrence Lifschultz, South Asia correspondent for
the Far Eastern Economic Review, the Mukti Bahini leader, Abdul Kader Siddiqui,
“personally bayoneted” non-Bengalis to death and the entire incident was filmed
by foreign film crews whom Siddiqui had invited to witness the spectacle.
For the record, as per the 1951 census there were 671,000
Biharis in East Pakistan-and imagine up to 20 percent of the entire Bihari
population was massacred by the Mukti Bahini. According to Yasmin Saikia’s
‘Women, War and the Making of Bangladesh’, thousands of Bihari women were raped
and tortured by the Mukti Bahini (Duke University Press; page 41).
As of 16 December 1971, the total strength of the Pakistani army
troops posted in East Pakistan stood at 34,000 (of which 23,000 were infantry).
By December 1971, the total strength of Indian troops around East Pakistan
stood at between 150,000 and 400,000 with an additional 100,000 Indian-trained
Mukti Bahini. The Indian air force deployed four Hunter Squadrons, one Sukhoi
Squadron, three Gnat Squadrons and three MiG-21 Squadrons.
The Indian navy deployed Aircraft Carrier Vikrant comprising 47
aircraft, eight destroyers, two submarines and three landing ship tanks. In
December 1971, India’s 4 Infantry Division, 9 Infantry Division, 20 Mountain
Division, 6 Mountain Division, 8 Mountain Division, 57 Mountain Division and 23
Division invaded East Pakistan.
The old saying is that “no one has been able to strike terror
into others and at the same time enjoy peace of mind”. The Mukti Bahini
terrorists may have been forgotten but the terror that they unleashed on
innocent Biharis and other non-Bengalis cannot be whipped off the history
books.
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