MUNIR AKRAM
The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to
the UN.
IN the midst of major global transitions, Pakistan confronts
multiple challenges: domestic discord, terrorism, Indian hostility and
subversion, Afghan chaos and American pressure. The low energy response of
Pakistan’s ruling classes to these challenges displays an absence of
self-confidence and an assumption that Pakistan’s destiny will be determined by
forces and factors other than ourselves.
Such attitudes are ill-suited to the world’s fifth largest
country by population; one defended by the sixth largest, nuclear equipped,
armed forces; with an economy growing at 5pc annually despite terrorist
violence, political turmoil and dysfunctional governance.
It is universally acknowledged that Pakistanis are a resilient
and resourceful people. Yet Pakistan has become a ‘soft state’ because its
elites have embraced selfish goals nationally and a subservient posture
internationally.
Over the decades, our ruling classes have become inured to the
patronage of our Cold War ‘ally’, the United States, and other rich ‘benefactors’.
They cannot contemplate the consequences of cutting the umbilical cord of
external dependency. For most of Pakistan’s ‘common’ people, who do not benefit
from this largesse, the impact of the oft-threatened termination of external
financial or political support would be marginal and bearable.
Pakistan’s elites have
embraced selfish goals nationally and a subservient posture internationally.
If the interests of the elite are set aside and national
interest guides policy exclusively, Pakistan has the intrinsic capacity to
withstand external pressure, overcome most of its present challenges and
exploit the vast opportunities offered by the current strategic transition in
world affairs.
In Pakistan today, domestic terrorism and violent extremism can be
eliminated if the National Action Plan is implemented without regard to the
political umbrellas that protect some of these violent elements.
Action against the TTP safe havens in Afghanistan is held back
by concern about America’s reaction. Yet, unless the US-Nato forces themselves
eliminate these safe havens, Pakistan will have to do so if it is to stop
India’s subversion from Afghan territory.
The Kabul government can surely be ‘persuaded’ to stop its
constant abuse and perfidious collaboration with India against Pakistan if
Islamabad utilises its considerable leverage. Once Kabul is cooperative, the
Afghan Taliban, including the Haqqanis, should be either convinced to join a
peace dialogue or ejected totally from Pakistan’s territory. Pakistan does not
need ‘strategic depth’; it has nuclear weapons.
India is a hegemonist power. If it is to preserve the rationale
for its creation, Pakistan cannot accept Indian domination. It must maintain
credible nuclear and conventional deterrence but avoid war with India. However,
until the Kashmir dispute is resolved, a conflict could be triggered by a
popular Kashmiri revolt like the present one. If India imposes a war on
Pakistan, the latter should not rely entirely on the threat of nuclear
retaliation. India could also be defeated conventionally — with the help of our
people.
Somewhere in our foreign ministry’s archives is the record of a
conversation between the then foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and China’s
premier Chou En-lai soon after the 1965 war. When Bhutto explained that
Pakistan’s offensive on Akhoor had to be halted and its forces redeployed to
protect Lahore after India attacked across the border, the Chinese premier
opined that Pakistan should not have redeployed. Pakistani forces, he said, would
have been welcomed in Kashmir; on the other hand, the people of Lahore would
have fought Indian occupation on the streets and, with this people’s struggle,
‘you would have made your nation.’ There is a lesson here for our strategists.
There is considerable anxiety in Islamabad about US policy under
Trump. Despite the prime minister’s effusive phone conversation with Trump,
Pakistan is likely to suffer collateral damage from the growing US rivalry with
China and its strategic partnership with India. However, unless the US seeks
Pakistan’s submission to Indian domination or attempts to neutralise its
nuclear deterrence, a cooperative or at least non-hostile relationship can be
established with Washington. If appropriately negotiated, common ground can be
found in combating terrorism, on Afghanistan, reciprocal nuclear restraint with
India and mutually beneficial investment and economic cooperation.
China’s emergence as a global economic and military power offers
a historic opportunity for Pakistan. It must be grasped with both hands. The
CPEC project is critical, economically and strategically, for Pakistan. If
pursued with vision, the opportunity can encompass: investment in all sectors
of the Pakistan economy; rapid modernisation of Pakistan’s defence capabilities;
stabilisation of Afghanistan; and creation of an economic network under the One
Belt, One Road initiative integrating Pakistan with Iran, the GCC, Central Asia
and Russia, apart from China.
Yet Pakistan should not rely on China or any other country for
its development. The Pakistani state has to play a central role. Some important
goals that Islamabad can secure are:
One, achieve financial independence. Tax revenues can be
doubled, from the present 9pc of GDP to the global norm of 18pc. Savings of 1-2pc
of the federal budget can be realised by divesting major loss-making government
corporations. Pakistan’s capital markets can be enlarged to provide local
development finance. The additional fiscal capacity can be used to eliminate
extreme poverty, expand education and health programmes, support small farmers
and small and medium enterprises.
Two, adopt a ‘Pakistan first’ industrial policy and reverse the
unilateral disarmament of the country’s trade regime. Nascent industries need
to be nurtured through higher tariffs and a clampdown on smuggling. They can
meet the high domestic demand for consumer and durable goods, which is the main
driver of Pakistan’s growth and, once competitive, contribute to expanding
Pakistan’s dismally small exports.
Three, support agriculture. This sector still supports 60pc of
Pakistan’s population. Our crop yields are one-eighth of those in industrial
countries. With adequate financial and technical support, especially to smaller
farmers, Pakistan can emerge as a regional breadbasket.
Improved governance is essential. In today’s globalised world,
no country can progress without an efficient bureaucracy. Pakistan’s
administrators should be functionally competent, competitively chosen,
handsomely remunerated and fully accountable.
None of these goals can be adequately achieved without decisive
national leadership. Our electoral democracy, chained to feudal and industrial
power structures, requires to be reformed to enable clean and competent leaders
to secure office. Only then will the Pakistani ‘tiger’ be able to leave the
cage in which it has been confined.
The writer is a former
Pakistan ambassador to the UN.
Published in Dawn
December 25th, 2016
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