Sarah Khan
After signing of Indo-US nuclear deal in 2005, India is ambitiously working on its nuclear program, especially related to production of fissile material and nuclear weapons development. The deal granted to India by so called “world champion of international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, United States, has allowed India to use its indigenous resources for weapons productions only. Moreover, the deal didn’t compel India to adhere to international nuclear non-proliferation regimes and convention. This gave India added confidence to invest heavily in the military domain of nuclear production without any international obligations. In addition to weapons production, India is striving to built and purchase offensive and defensive missile systems which may aggravate regional tensions in the coming decades.
One of the important aspects pertaining to Indian nuclear program is its unsafeguarded facilities. A study titled ‘Indian Unsafeguarded Nuclear Program’ which was published by the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) and was co-authored by four nuclear scholars, unveils a new and comprehensive assessment of India’s nuclear weapon capacity. The study indicates that India has sufficient material and the technical capacity to produce between 356 and 492 nuclear bombs.
The study contains evidence that India has the largest and oldest unsafeguarded nuclear programme in the developing world and among the states not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Member states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should consider the large and swiftly expanding Indian nuclear bomb capacity when dealing with India’s NSG membership and ensure that Indian membership of this export control arrangement does not, in any way, help India expand and accelerate its nuclear weapons program.
India operates a number of facilities, including eight of its pressurized heavy water power reactors (PHWRs), that serve a civilian or commercial function and that are not listed in India’s safeguards agreement. These facilities are not subject to safeguards. This category includes three heavy water production plants that India expressly designated for civilian use as part of the Separation Plan but that are not subject to safeguards because they are not listed in India’s safeguards agreement and India’s additional protocol does not extend to them.
In addition to all nuclear power facilities, there are 52,000-plus radiological facilities. These include medical institutions, industrial uses, and research facilities, and safety violations happen at them, too. There have been several nuclear accidents at various facilities. A few incidents are reported owing to secrecy that shrouds Indian nuclear program. The most serious incident to date is Mayapuri in 2010, in which a cobalt-60 source was sold and taken apart in a scrapyard, killing one man and hospitalising seven others.
Arguably, India’s fast breeder reactor (FBR) and thorium fuel cycle programs fall into the category of civilian unsafeguarded, although both are capable of producing unsafeguarded weapons-usable material. In March 2006, Singh stated that FBRs would be excluded from safeguards during the development stage in order to avoid “encumbrances” on the program. India has maintained the option of using its FBRs to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.
World’s most alarming nuclear dangers emanate from India in contemporary times. India is home to large stockpiles of fissile material and it continues to accumulate even larger stockpiles in the absence of any international mechanism to impose limit/ban on fissile material production. Having lowest standards of nuclear safety and security as per Nuclear Threat Initiative index 2016, it has some of the world’s highest population density. India is also susceptible to a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility, or the theft of nuclear materials to create a radiological bomb or crude nuclear weapon.
The incident of firing and killing of three guards at Madras nuclear facility in October 2014 depicted deplorable standards of nuclear security in India. Such incidents at nuclear facilities indicate an urgent need for improvement. Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) in Mumbai is a salient case study of the intersection of terror and nuclear materials. It houses the Dhruva reactor, India’s major source of weapons-grade plutonium. An attack on a facility like BARC could constitute aggression against India’s nuclear weapons production and reconstitution capabilities. Foregoing in view, US and all those major powers running to seize nuclear deals with India must take concrete steps to compel India for enhancing its nuclear safety and security standards at all nuclear facilities. Accumulation of fissile material, missile development and nuclear weapons production by India needs to be halted in order to avoid nuclear perils emanating from India.
One of the important aspects pertaining to Indian nuclear program is its unsafeguarded facilities. A study titled ‘Indian Unsafeguarded Nuclear Program’ which was published by the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) and was co-authored by four nuclear scholars, unveils a new and comprehensive assessment of India’s nuclear weapon capacity. The study indicates that India has sufficient material and the technical capacity to produce between 356 and 492 nuclear bombs.
The study contains evidence that India has the largest and oldest unsafeguarded nuclear programme in the developing world and among the states not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Member states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should consider the large and swiftly expanding Indian nuclear bomb capacity when dealing with India’s NSG membership and ensure that Indian membership of this export control arrangement does not, in any way, help India expand and accelerate its nuclear weapons program.
India operates a number of facilities, including eight of its pressurized heavy water power reactors (PHWRs), that serve a civilian or commercial function and that are not listed in India’s safeguards agreement. These facilities are not subject to safeguards. This category includes three heavy water production plants that India expressly designated for civilian use as part of the Separation Plan but that are not subject to safeguards because they are not listed in India’s safeguards agreement and India’s additional protocol does not extend to them.
In addition to all nuclear power facilities, there are 52,000-plus radiological facilities. These include medical institutions, industrial uses, and research facilities, and safety violations happen at them, too. There have been several nuclear accidents at various facilities. A few incidents are reported owing to secrecy that shrouds Indian nuclear program. The most serious incident to date is Mayapuri in 2010, in which a cobalt-60 source was sold and taken apart in a scrapyard, killing one man and hospitalising seven others.
Arguably, India’s fast breeder reactor (FBR) and thorium fuel cycle programs fall into the category of civilian unsafeguarded, although both are capable of producing unsafeguarded weapons-usable material. In March 2006, Singh stated that FBRs would be excluded from safeguards during the development stage in order to avoid “encumbrances” on the program. India has maintained the option of using its FBRs to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.
World’s most alarming nuclear dangers emanate from India in contemporary times. India is home to large stockpiles of fissile material and it continues to accumulate even larger stockpiles in the absence of any international mechanism to impose limit/ban on fissile material production. Having lowest standards of nuclear safety and security as per Nuclear Threat Initiative index 2016, it has some of the world’s highest population density. India is also susceptible to a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility, or the theft of nuclear materials to create a radiological bomb or crude nuclear weapon.
The incident of firing and killing of three guards at Madras nuclear facility in October 2014 depicted deplorable standards of nuclear security in India. Such incidents at nuclear facilities indicate an urgent need for improvement. Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) in Mumbai is a salient case study of the intersection of terror and nuclear materials. It houses the Dhruva reactor, India’s major source of weapons-grade plutonium. An attack on a facility like BARC could constitute aggression against India’s nuclear weapons production and reconstitution capabilities. Foregoing in view, US and all those major powers running to seize nuclear deals with India must take concrete steps to compel India for enhancing its nuclear safety and security standards at all nuclear facilities. Accumulation of fissile material, missile development and nuclear weapons production by India needs to be halted in order to avoid nuclear perils emanating from India.
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