In calling out the
"safe havens for terrorists in Pakistan" as part of his Afghanistan policy,
US President Donald Trump has given formal shape to a reality that has been
brewing in South Asia since Washington fell out with Islamabad post the Osama bin Laden
raid.
With
both Beijing and Moscow coming
out in Islamabad's defence almost immediately, the China-Russia-Pakistan
axis has been formally inaugurated, with the US and India
allying in Afghanistan—as epitomised by Trump's call for New Delhi to help out
Washington in the region.
Washington
and New Delhi have been conspicuously toward drawn each other since the
2008 nuclear deal,
a similar version of which Islamabad has been demanding as well.
However, initial US policy had been to ensure that proximity with India doesn't
alienate its traditional ally Pakistan, which heretofore had a pivotal role for
Washington in Afghanistan.
What the Trump regime has done
to chastise Islamabad over Afghanistan echoes the Indian stance in the region,
specifically targeting Pakistan's "jugular vein": Kashmir.
Following
the bin Laden raid, the relations between
the US and Pakistan became increasingly acrimonious under the Obama regime.
Under the Trump presidency,
the Republicans in the Congress that had already been clamouring to revisit aid
to Pakistan—asking Islamabad to pay for its F-16s last
year, for instance—now have a formal outlet to vent their frustration.
What
the Trump regime has done to chastise Islamabad over Afghanistan echoes the
Indian stance in the region, specifically targeting Pakistan's "jugular vein":
Kashmir.
In
little over three months, Trump implicitly equated Kashmir's freedom
fight with terrorism at an Islamic summit in Riyadh, sanctioned
the Kashmir-bound Hizbul Mujahideen and
its commander Syed Salahuddin as
terrorists, and now officially underscored the problem of Pakistan
"harbouring terrorists" while seeking the solution from India.
Meanwhile, China has continued to forestall New
Delhi's move to blacklist Kashmir-bound jihadists at the UN, as it continues
work on the $62 billion corridor with
Pakistan, while further reigniting its own border dispute with
India in Doklam.
Moscow
drawing closer to Islamabad, at least militarily, naturally overlapped with US
angst vis-à-vis Pakistan. It started with Russia lifting its self-imposed
arms embargo on Pakistan in November 2014, following by a
landmark "military
cooperation" agreementthat culminated in the first ever joint military drill between
the two countries last year.
In
the meantime, Pakistan will be importing Mi-35 combat
helicopters in addition to the Russian Klimov RD-93
engines for its JF-17 multi-role fighters.
Moscow and Islamabad have also signed a deal for the construction of the North-South gas pipeline from
Karachi to Lahore, to cater to the ever growing energy needs in
Pakistan's most populous province.
The
shaping of these axes in South Asia has been further facilitated by Indo-Pak
ties reaching their nadir amidst
increasing volatility in Kashmir.
This formation of hard
alliances is a return to 20th century diplomacy and the rigid rulebook that
defined bilateral relations, and which caused wars of all kinds.
With
the US involved in direct confrontation in Ukraine and
the South China Sea,
as on-ground samples of its longstanding rivalries with Russia and China, the
formalisation of coalitions means the respective alliances could henceforth be
backing territorial disputes and regional crises as single units, drawn against
one another and overlapping with the security and economic cooperation between
the groups.
Even
so, Russia cannot overlook the economic power that
India is growing into. It is especially unlikely that Moscow would stop its military exports to
New Delhi, despite its two-pronged security antagonism with Islamabad and
Beijing.
Another
promising ally for the China-Russia-Pakistan axis would've been Iran,
considering Tehran's proximity to
Moscow and bitterness vis-à-vis the US, which has seen it join
Beijing and Moscow in condemning Trump's
accusations against Islamabad. But Pakistan's own ties with Iran
have deteriorated in recent times, with Tehran echoing the US India in accusing
Islamabad of providing safe havens to terror groups, and even threatening military invasion inside
Pakistani territory.
Furthermore,
Pakistan's unflinching obligations
to Saudi Arabia, which is the foundation of its differences with
Iran, coupled with New Delhi and Tehran's growing economic cooperation along
with Kabul—as exemplified by the Chabahar Port—mean
that Iran isn't a natural fit for either of the two groups, especially since
Washington is unlikely to diplomatically ease things for Tehran under Trump,
who has signed a "$110 billion"
arms deal with Saudi Arabia.
This
formation of hard alliances is a return to 20th century
diplomacy and the rigid rulebook that defined bilateral relations, and which
caused wars of all kinds. But there still might be a chance that the
China-Pakistan-Russia axis might end up being shaped by the common interests
that define it, rather than the ramifications for the states that it alienates.
Even
so, with stridently antagonistic voices and policymaking now at the helm in
Washington and New Delhi, coupled with Islamabad's rigidly masochistic shielding of jihadist groups, it is likely that
confrontation rather than cooperation will remain the order of the day in South
Asia—at least in the near future.
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